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Abstract
This paper applies principles from game theory to the problem of allocating the cost of a
shared facility, such as a pipeline. The theory of cooperative games strongly suggests that no
method exists for allocating costs that will achieve all major policy goals. We apply results from
the theory of cooperative games and principles of cost allocation to assess some commonly adopted
rules for allocating costs and defining unit charges. Most notably, the postage-stamp toll is found
to fail a minimal set of commonly applied principles.
This paper applies principles from game theory to the
problem ofallocating the cost of a shared facility, such as
a pipeline. The theory of cooperative games strongly
suggests that no method exists for allocating costs that
will achieve all major policy goals. We apply results from
the theory of cooperative games and principles of cost
allocation to assess some commonly adopted rules for
allocating costs and defining unit charges. Most notably,
the postage-stamp toll is found to fail a minimal set of
commonly applied principles.
eet article applique les principes tires de la theorie des
jeux au probIeme de la repartition des couts d'une
installation partagee telle qu'un pipeline. La theorie des
jeux cooperatifs suggere fortement qu'il n'existe pas de
methode de repartition des coft-ts qui puisse satisfaire tous
les objectifs principaux en matiere de politique. Nous
appliquons ies resultats tires de ia thiorie des jwx
cooperatifs et des principes de repartition des coft-ts pour
evaiuer certaines regles d' usage adopties pour repartir Ies
couts et difinir Ies frais unitaires. En particulier, il
ressort que Ie droit timbre-poste ne salisfait pas aun
ensemble minimal de principes d'usage.
D.]. Salant and G.C. Watkins are with the Law &
Economics Consulting Group, Emeryville, Califor-
nia.
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Cost-Allocation
Principles for Pipeline
Capacity and Usage
D.J. SALANT and C.C. WATKINS
I. Introduction
Transmission facilities, such as pipelines, lead
to debates about cost sharing whenever there
are multiple users of large segments. The cost-
allocation literature strongly suggests that
there exists no way of allocating pipeline costs
which is immune to criticism. And a system of
uniform rates (postage-stamp rates), for exam-
ple, is no exception.l Our intent in this paper is
two fold. First, to outline some of the main
principles that most would agree a cost-alloca-
tion system should serve to satisfy the oft-cited
statutory admonition of being "fair and rea-
sonable." Second, to explain the implications of
those principles.
To provide suitable focus initially we dis-
cuss postage-stamp systems in the context of a
natural gas pipeline system and explain its
pros and cons. Then we take a more analytical
approach, but with no predetermined bias as
to what constitutes the optimal way in which
to allocate pipeline network costs among
users. Instead, we work from first principles.
Over the past decade or so there have been
developments in economic techniques that
apply notions of fairness and equity, as well as
11 Postage-stamp rate design has been applied by
Nova Gas Transmission Limited in the Province of
Alberta, Canada for most of that system's life.
91
Salant and Watkins: Cost-Allocation Principles for Pipeline Capacity and Usage
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1996
efficiency, to cost allocation. There has been
increased recognition of the need to look at the
role that various fairness criteria play in allo-
cating costs. OUT paper makes it apparent how
some current schemes such as postage-stamp
rates can conflict with commonly accepted
fairness standards.
We examine the so-called axiomatic ap-
proach in order analytically to examine alter-
native concepts of fairness, or "just and rea-
sonable," for determining how to allocate
costs. Our analysis is based on axiomatic social
choice theory developed over the past twenty
or so years, and in particular on axiomatic
cost-allocation theory. Axiomatic cost-alloca-
tion approaches have been applied to water
systems, airport landing fees, managerial ac-
counting, flood control, navigation, and power
systems. We apply this theory to identify a
formula for allocating costs. We find that a
postage-stamp rate generally fails to pass most
commonly used standards for fairness and
reasonableness, and could induce both ineffi-
cient bypass and inefficient resource develop-
ment. Application of the axiomatic approach
can provide some assurance that hidden im-
plications of commonly proposed notions of
fairness have not been overlooked.
The paper is organized as follows. Section
11 briefly discusses postage-stamp schemes.
Basic cost-allocation and fairness principles are
outlined in Section III. Additional fairness cri-
teria aTe discussed in Section IV, including the
nucleolus and the Shapley value. Section V
discusses how the Shapley value can be used
as a guide for cost allocation. Section VI ad-
dresses other equity and efficiency issues. Sec-
tion VII is a summary.
II. Postage-Stamp Schemes
In North America, regulated pipeline tolls are
normally set to yield a total revenue require-
ment. There is typically some latitude for the
regulator in determining how these tolls are
set. These may consist of fixed and variable
charges, be distance related, or fixed within
zones, or may be uniform throughout: the so-
called postage-stamp system.
A postage-stamp system is one in which all
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users pay the same amount per unit or parcel,
of capacity, independent of transport dis-
tances. This type of rate structure is most ap-
propriate when: (a) there are high fixed con-
nection costs, so that the total costs are not so
distance-sensitive; (b) there is little variation in
the distances among the different users' ship-
ments; (c) there are large transaction costs as-
sociated with distance-related tolls 2 when
users have similar average distances of haul;
and (d) when system complexity and cost in-
terdependence make cost causation nebulous.
However, a postage-stamp tariff is inher-
ently inefficient if total costs are distance- sen-
sitive and/or if there is a significant variation
in the sources of demand. 3 For instance, if one
user wishes to use only a small part of the
pipeline and many others use most of its entire
length, the stand-alone cost of the one short-
haul firm could be much less than lin th of the
pipeline cost, where there aTe n firms that use
it in total. This situation would encourage a
potential contributor to the network costs to
incur the cost of building bypass facilities.
Such incentives can persist even if these by-
pass facilities were more costly than the in-
cremental cost of allowing the short-haul firm
access to, and use of, the pipeline system. And
it is here that bypass is inefficient.
Furthermore, even when the postage-
stamp rates do not initially create incentives
for inefficient bypass, circumstances can
change, which could cause such incentives to
emerge. Technology can change, new fields
can come on line, and a host of other factors
can alter demand patterns in such a way as to
create incentives for inefficient bypass. More-
over, the rate structure can affect incentives to
bring new areas on line in the first place. We
introduce principles for cost allocation that
take into account the possibility that condi-
tions can change over time.
2/ This may be manifest in high administrative sav-
ings for the utility itself or for the users of the facil-
ity with a postage-stamp regime.
3/ Also, see the later discussion of the indirect im-
pacts of postage-stamp rates on the efficiency of re-
source allocation.
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III. Basic Cost-Allocation Principles
We start by considering two commonly ac-
cepted minimal properties that a cost alloca-
tion should satisfy: (a) the stand-alone cost
test; and (b) the incremental cost test. We ex-
plain why some simple approaches, such as
the postage-stamp system, fail to meet these
two principles.
The stand-alone cost test has two parts. First,
it requires that the cost share borne by each
user not exceed that user's stand-alone costs. If
the proposed cost-allocation rule satisfies the
condition that no single pipeline user can do
better on his or her own than under the pro-
posed cost allocation, then it satisfies the indi-
vidual rationality condition. The second part of
the stand-alone cost test applies to subsets or
groups of users; it requires that the cost alloca-
tion satisfy a group rationality condition. The
group rationality condition requires that no
group of users be able to self-supply for less
than their combined costs under the proposed
allocation rule. If an allocation fails the stand-
alone cost test for any coalition, or group of
users, then any such group would have an in-
centive to bypass the system and self-provide.
Together, the individual and group rationality
conditions constitute the stand-alone cost test.
The stand-alone cost test is a condition for all
parties to cooperate voluntarily and use the
system. It also means that each user will find it
individually rational to remain on the system
and pay his assigned cost share.
The other minimal condition for fairness is
the incremental cost test. This test is satisfied if
no single group of users is subsidizing an-
other. The incremental cost test also means
that the allocation of costs to any group of
users must be at least as large as the incremen-
tal costs of including that group on the system.
Both the stand-alone and incremental cost tests
are equity, or fairness, conditions.
The incremental cost test is equivalent to a
stand-alone cost test whenever joint costs are
fully allocated. When costs are fully allocated
and the cost allocation fails a stand-alone test,
it is necessarily the case that cross-subsidies
exist, in the sense that one group's contribution
to the total costs is less than the incremental
costs of serving it. To see this, suppose there
are two groups of pipeline users, and that the
costs allocated to the first group were to ex-
ceed its stand-alone costs. The allocation of the
total costs to this group and the remaining
group will sum to the total system costs, as-
suming all costs are allocated. Thus, the costs
of the entire system less the stand-alone costs
of serving only the first group will then exceed
the costs allocated to the second group. In
other words, if the costs allocated to one group
exceed its stand-alone costs, the costs allocated
to everyone else are less than the incremental
costs of serving them, where these are repre-
sented by the system costs less the stand-alone
costs of serving everyone not in the first group.
A seemingly minimal requirement for a
cost allocation is that it be fair at least in the
sense that it passes both stand-alone and in-
cremental cost tests. Then it would provide in-
centives for all interested parties to cooperate,
would not allow cross-subsidies to exist, and
would allocate all the costs among all users.
The set of all such cost allocations is called the
core. This basic, if somewhat abstract, concept
is helpful in limiting discussion of how costs
should be allocated and can eliminate some
allocations, such as postage-stamp rates, that
might otherwise seem reasonable.
Consider a simple example adapted from
Young (1994), in which the costs of serving
firm A alone is $11 million, firm B alone is $7
million, and the costs of serving the two to-
gether is $15 million - which provides sav-
ings of $3 million over separate systems serv-
ing each firm. Such savings are precisely what
a pipeline system is intended to offer users. It
is not obvious what is the right way to allocate
costs or cost savings in this situation. An equal
division of costs (which is how postage-stamp
rates are usually set up) would set the price at
$7.5 million each, and firm B would not wish
to participate in a joint project because it
would be better off on its own. Thus, an equal
division of costs fails the stand-alone cost test.
Further, suppose that firm A uses three times
the capacity that firm B does, at least over the
part of the system they both use. Then a cost
allocation in proportion to capacity, such as
would be the case with a purely demand-re-
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lated toll, would result in a price to firm A of
$11.25 million and $3.75 million to firm B. This
is another instance in which what seems to be
a sensible cost-sharing rule fails to be in the
core, that is, it does not pass a stand-alone test,
given A's stand-alone costs of $11 million.
However, a number of cost-sharing rules
will be in the "core" for this example. An equal
division of t,he savings above their respective
stand-alone costs will result in cost shares of
$9.5 million and $5.5 million for A and B, re-
spectively. Division of savings in proportion to
demand will result in a cost allocation of $8.75
million and $6.25 million. Division of savings
based on opportunity, or stand-alone, costs
implies a cost allocation of $9.17 million and
$5.83 million. All three of these allocations are
in the core, since both firms have allocated
costs below their respective stand-alone costs.
More generally, the core includes all cost allo-
cations which fall in a particular range of val-
ues. That is, there will typically be upper and
lower bounds on each firm's cost share for any
cost allocation in the core. Although the core
can rule out some harmless sounding C05t-
sharing schemes, such as equal splits of costs
or postage-stamp schemes, it does not identify
a unique split. Notice too that the logic of the
stand-alone criteria can also be used to charac-
terize the potential problems with cost-sharing
arrangements such as a postage-stamp
scheme, which indeed does fail the crucial
stand-alone test.
Aside from non-uniqueness, another diffi-
culty with the core is that it could be empty: it
is possible that no cost allocation will satisfy
the core conditions. Suppose, for example, the
costs for a stand-alone system for each of firms
A, B, or C were $6 million, the costs of serving
any two firms was $7 million, and the costs of
serving all three were $11 million. In this case,
the core would be empty.4 Whether or not
4/ Here, the constraints for a cost allocation to be in
the core cannot all hold instantaneously. In other
words, the costs allocated to any pair of firms can-
not exceed $7 million, and there are three such con-
straints' which in aggregate imply that the total
costs allocated to the three firms cannot exceed
$10.5 million. Moreover, the $11 million total costs
must be split among the three. These two conditions
are contradictory. To put it another way, simultane-
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conditions for voluntary cooperation embod-
ied in the core will be satisfied depends on the
properties of the technology and costs. S
IV. Additional Fairness Criteria
There are a number of other fairness condi-
tions that a cost-allocation mechanism should
probably satisfy. Not all of them can always be
satisfied simultaneously. Policy makers' choice
of a formula for allocating costs will depend
on which fairness criteria they judge to be the
most important at the time. Here, we first pre-
sent a heuristic discussion of the major stan-
dards that have been analyzed in the theoreti-
cal literature. We then explain, at least in the
context of a theoretically ideal world with no
uncertainty and no administrative or compli-
ance costs, how these principles can nail down
specific cost-sharing formulae.
One condition we shall want to impose on
a cost-allocation rule is that it "work" in chang-
ing environments. That is, the principles laid
out one day should not be revised the next due
to a change in circumstances. In the case of
Nova Gas Transmission Limited (NGTL), the
Alberta Energy and Utilities Board has upheld
the postage-stamp toll with the justification
that the system should encourage gas devel-
opment in remote areas of Alberta. By doing
so the Board, at least implicitly, made the deci-
sian that it was worth sacrificing the stand-
alone cost test for the sake of this other policy
objective. Over time, with the development
that has occurred, the justification for the
cross-subsidy embodied in postage-stamp
ously supplying all three is obviously most econom-
ical' and would require that each user pay $3.67
million on average (one may pay less than $3.67
million, but then the other two will have to pay
more than $7.33 million, or ($11 million - $3.67 mil-
lion), violating the stand-alone cost test. In any case,
one pair of buyers will end up being assessed for
more than their $7 million stand-alone costs. So
there will be a pair of buyers who will prefer to
build their own system rather than paying their
share of the total system costs. The core is empty, as
it requires that the stand-alone test hold for all
coalitions as well as individuals.
5/ One condition for the core to be non-empty is that
the cost function be concave in the sense defined in
Young (1994) and discussed below.
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rates has much less force and now might dis-
courage development elsewhere or encourage
excess development in remote areas.
Moreover, it is not clear how strong are the
merits of a system that creates incentives to
develop facilities in regions that would other-
wise not be economically viable. Basic eco-
nomic principles imply that any subsidies em-
bodied in the postage-stamp regime are not
justifiable on grounds of economic efficiency.
Even if remote regions were economically vi-
able, the effect of a uniform postage-stamp
system is effectively to tax production in low-
cost, not-so-remote areas and subsidize pro-
duction in remote, high-cost areas. Both the tax
and the subsidy create deadweight losses. This
is because regions with above-average costs
produce at higher-than-optimal (i.e., efficient)
rates, while those with below-average costs
produce at lower-than-optimal rates. 6
There are a number of other fairness crite-
ria that policy makers might wish to apply in
allocating costs. Below we describe several
which have been analyzed and discuss some of
their implications. One fairness criterion that
most would agree is desirable is that equals
bear equal cost shares. So if two firms affect
system costs in the same way, they should be
allocated the same costs. In addition, this sym-
metry condition requires that the cost alloca-
tion be invariant to the labelling of the firms
and to the order in which users are added to
the system. One significant objection to impos-
ing a symmetry requirement is that, in some
cases, an asymmetric cost allocation will in-
duce some to stay on the system and con-
tribute to total costs in excess of stand-alone
costs, whereas a symmetric scheme will lead to
bypass. Thus, the symmetry condition can
conflict with the stand-alone cost test.
Three other fairness and reasonability
properties that cost-allocation rules should
satisfy are a decomposition principle, a
monotonicity principle, and consistency. The
decomposition principle requires that each user
bears an equal share of the costs of the compo-
6/ A technical appendix, which illustrates the eco-
nomic losses associated with uniform tolls, is avail-
able from the authors on request.
nents it uses. It also implies that no one should
have to contribute to portions of the system
that they do not use at all. In other words, only
those who use some components should have
to pay for them. Monotonicity implies that as
total costs increase, allocated costs should also
increase, or at least not decrease. Consistency in
cost allocation says that the principles used in
determining cost shares for the entire set of
users should apply equally to subsets of users.
In combination, the decomposition princi-
ple and symmetry have strong implications for
cost allocation. They essentially nail down a
unique allocation in which everyone benefit-
ting from a component pays essentially the in-
cremental costs of satisfying their demands.
The fairness criteria we have listed above
satisfy the condition that they continue to ap-
ply as the environment changes. However,
they do sometimes conflict, and different sets
of criteria imply different cost-allocation rules.
In what follows we try to outline what, in our
view, are some of the more important criteria,
and explain potential conflicts and their rami-
fications.
In particular, we consider two cost-alloca-
tion rules that have been well analyzed in the
economics literature: the nucleolus and the
Shapley value. These are two alternative views
of what constitutes an ideal cost-sharing rule.
Subsequently (Section V), we explain how
these two ideals can be applied to determine
pipeline rates.7
IV.l The Nucleolus: Consistent, Symmetric, and
Homogeneous Cost Allocations
The nucleolus is derived from a set of axioms.
In particular, the nucleolus is the unique cost
allocation that is: (a) symmetric, in that it treats
equals equally and does not change when
agents are re-labelled, or when the order in
7/ Under certain circumstances, setting rates using
"Ramsey prices", in which rates are inversely pro-
portional to the elasticity of demand for pipeline
use, will be efficient. However, as noted by Young
(1994) and by Lewis (1949), Ramsey prices are in-
herently inequitable since they penalize those with
least resort to alternatives. This aspect also makes
Ramsey prices politically unpalatable. They are not
discussed in this paper.
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which they are added to the system is
changed; (b) passes through costs directly in-
curred by shippers; (c) is homogeneous, in that
if all costs go up or down by some proportion,
IX, all users' cost allocations go up or down by
the same proportion IX; and (d) is consistent for
sub-groups of the entire set of pipeline users.
The nucleolus can be calculated by splitting
the costs equally among the users of a corn-
man facility, or a portion thereof. It is essen-
tially the cost allocation that is the mid-point
of the core. The nucleolus also has the property
that it maximizes the cost savings of the group
of users that has the smallest cost savings
among all possible groupings of facility users.
The notion here is that various individual
or groups of userS of a system may enjoy vari-
0us degrees of savings in using it. For exam-
pIe, a large-scale user may obtain fewer
economies of scale or scope in relation to the
relevant stand-alone costs compared with
those obtained by a small-scale user (at least
on a per-unit basis). The nucleolus maximizes
the savings enjoyed by those enjoying the least
advantage from being in the system compared
with the best alternative available for that
grouping. The main problem with the nucleo-
lus is that it is not monotonic. What this means
is that the cost share of a user could fall even
though he were using a component of the sys-
tem whose costs have increased. 8
IV.2 The Shapley Value: Symmetric, Additive, and
Monotonic Cost Allocations with No Cross-
Subsidies
The Shapley value yields another cost-allocation
8/ This problem could be overcome by the per capita
(or per user) nucleolus, which is also the maximum of
the series of cost savings for all possible groupings
of users and which will be monotonic. However, it
is not consistent. Consistency is an important crite-
rion when, for example, in the case of a pipeline the
set of receipt and delivery points is changing over
time. Consistency requires that the cost allocation
for any coalition not change when the cost-alloca-
tion problem is confined to one involving only those
in the given group. Note, too, that neither the nu-
cleolus nor the per capita nucleolus will be easy to
measure. What would be desirable is a cost-alloca-
tion rule that is relatively easily computed and sat-
isfies the principles of consistency, homogeneity,
and symmetry.
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rule that satisfies many desirable properties.
Like the nucleolus, the Shapley value can be
derived from a set of axioms. These axioms
differ slightly from those that identify the nu-
cleolus. The Shapley value has the additional
property that it is also a fairly natural exten-
sion of a simple rule that applies in special cir-
cumstances. This simpler concept, which is the
decomposition principle mentioned earlier,
roughly speaking says that a firm that uses
several pieces of the system should pay a suit-
able share of those pieces it uses.
To apply the decomposition principle, the
stand-alone cost of serving any group of users
must be decomposable into the costs of the
components, or the cost elements, used by that
group. If the cost function were decomposable,
then the decomposition principle would
merely allocate the costs of each component
suitably among each component's users. So,
for example, if there were three firms using a
given pipeline link, the decomposition princi-
pIe would allocate the costs of that link in pro-
portion to the decomposed costs among those
three firms. This allocation of costs should be
based on both usage and each firm's fraction of
the reserve capacity for that link. In other
words, the allocation of costs should be based
on those factors that contribute to costs.
The decomposition principle does yield
outcomes that are in the core, that is, outcomes
that satisfy stand-alone and incremental cost
tests. But the principle can only be applied
when costs can be decomposed into elements
that are additive. However, the same type of
idea can be extended to cases in which the cost
function cannot be decomposed so readily.
The Shapley value is the resulting cost aHoca-
tion. The exact expression for the Shapley
value is somewhat complicated, but it essen-
tially states that each firm will contribute an
equal proportion of the total costs allocated to
each possible group it could join.
More precisely, consider the incremental
costs of serving a given user when that user is
added to a group of users. Now, suppose that
system costs are calculated incrementally
when adding users to a group one at a time in
a random order. The Shapley value for a given
user is just the average of the incremental costs
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for that user among all possible ways in which
the incremental costs can be calculated for
him. Thus, the Shapley value is a cost alloca-
tion for each user that is based on a measure of
each user's average incremental costs.
As discussed in Young (1994), the Shapley
value has a number of desirable properties:
1. It is the unique cost-allocation rule that is:
(a) symmetric; (b) additive;9 and (c) charges
nothing to firms who do not contribute to
costs.
2. It is also the unique cost allocation that is
symmetric and strongly monotonic, that is, it
allocates all users larger cost shares when-
ever the total costs of serving everyone in-
creases.
3. The core of every case in which the cost
function satisfies a concavity condition (that
can be explained in terms of the number of
nodes and the length of the links) is non-
empty and contains the Shapley value.
The conditions that the cost-allocation rule
is additive and charges nothing to users who
do not impose costs on the system constitute,
what some would view, an important fairness
condition. Suppose, for example, that a system
component (sub-system) were built exclusively
to serve one small group of users. These fair-
ness conditions essentially imply that no one
outside that group would have to bear any of
the costs of that sub-system. Symmetry, as we
have discussed above, requires equal treat-
ment of firms that contribute equally to costs
and have equal usage. The concavity condi-
tion' can be also expressed as a submodularity
condition, and essentially means that the costs
of serving two groups plus the stand-alone
costs of serving those who are in both is less
than the sum of the stand-alone costs of each
of the groups. When costs are concave, the in-
cremental costs of adding users at new receipt
points or delivery points will be decreasing.
The Shapley value has one significant
drawback in that it need not be in the "core." In
other words, the Shapley value need not sat-
isfy the stand-alone cost test that we discussed
9/ A cost allocation is additive when, if MO users or
groups of users are combined, the cost allocation for
these users is the sum of the individual user cost
allocations.
above. However, the Shapley value has two
advantages: (1) it always exists; (2) it identifies
a unique cost allocation.
v. Implementation Issues
V.l Implementation of the Shapley Value
The nucleolus and the Shapley value provide
benchmarks for devising a toll system which
best approximates, as much as is practical,
fairness and reasonableness standards. Neither
can be directly applied with ease. To use either
of them requires that some possibly costly
administrative procedures be set up to impute
incremental costs for "each shipper, receipt me-
ter station, and delivery sales station.
To appreciate how a multi-zone system, in
which tolls are based on the zones correspond-
ing to pipeline receipt and delivery points, can
approximate the theoretical benchmark of the
Shapley value, it is useful first to describe the
steps that would be needed to implement it.
We focus our discussion on implementing or
approximating the Shapley value, although
most of it applies to the nucleolus as well.
In cases where costs can be decomposed, it
is relatively straightforward to compute the
Shapley value. It is possible that costs can be
decomposed in an appropriate manner for
many pipeline projects. In such cases, the use
of the Shapley value or the decomposition
principle would eliminate the need for debate
about whether rates should be based on the
average distance to the delivery or the receiv-
ing point. The Shapley value would impose
costs on those firms that use the relevant com-
ponents of the network. Debate might still oc-
cur as to how to measure incremental costs.
However, the Shapley value would essentially
evenly divide costs of components shared by
multiple gas producers or shippers. And all in-
cremental capacity costs would be directly al-
located to those shippers on the basis of for
whom that capacity was constructed.
V.2 Pitfalls in Implementing the Shapley Value
The Shapley value is a theoretical ideal. For
large and complex pipeline systems it is likely
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to be difficult to apply directly. Here, we de-
scribe some of the difficulties in applying the
Shapley value, and provide some suggestions
for surmounting them. One problem, which
we have noted above, is that the core need not
exist, and even if it does, the Shapley value
need not be in it. In such instances, there
would be groups of pipeline users who would
wish to break away to avoid the cost alloca-
tions imputed to them by the Shapley value.
Circumstances change, and so at some
points in time the Shapley value will be in the
core and at others it will fall outside of it.
Changes are always occurring in the potential
demands placed on the system. It would be
helpful if the cost-allocation rule were to re-
main viable for any likely scenario. The Shap-
ley value, which always exists, can always be
imposed; however, coalitions would, at times,
have incentives to break away. How likely, or
how often, this would occur is an empirical
question.
Another problem in implementing the
Shapley value, even in a simple case in which
costs are decomposable, is in measuring the
incremental costs attributable to each user. The
appropriate way to decompose and attribute
costs is likely to be in terms of the capacity
planned for each user. To appreciate the ease,
or difficulty, that would be encountered in at-
tempting to impute costs based on the Shapley
value, it is useful to examine the types of cost
attribution required. This will, in part, help
guide how best to implement a cost-sharing
rule in practice.
Incremental costs are based on the planned
capacity requirements that drive them. Direct
costs - the costs of actually moving the com-
modity in the transmission system - based on
the fairness principles embodied in the Shap-
ley value would be directly passed through.
Indeed the decomposition principle, in con-
junction with the principle that shippers im-
posing no costs on the system (or separable
portion thereof) are not allocated any costs, re-
quires that direct costs be passed through.
Thus, implementing the Shapley value would
require separation of direct costs, which are
passed directly through, from common or joint
costs. And then the common capacity costs, or
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the costs of building the capacity to meet pro-
jected demand, would be allocated among
users.
Of course not all capacity need be used,
and not all anticipated demand need be real-
ized. Conversely, in other instances, more de-
mand may be placed on the system than antic-
ipated. It is also the case that there could be
considerable differences in the percentage of
anticipated throughput that would actually
occur. This means that some users would ef-
fectively have reserved more capacity than
they needed and others less. Unused capacity
could then be traded on a capacity-release
market among the potential users. Such a mar-
ket would alleviate potential shortages and
enhance the efficiency and utilization of the
system.
On the administrative side, there is a ques-
tion of how to go about measuring component
costs and capacity costs. In particular, use of
the Shapley value requires that incremental
capacity be imputed for each user. It could be
difficult to obtain such measures based solely
on accounting data. Accounting data are not
intended to report the calculations made in ca-
pacity planning. Such calculations would be
needed to reconstruct fully the capacity costs
for each cost element. In particular, it can be
difficult to reconstruct precisely how capacity
planning and investment decisions were based
on projected demands and to decompose those
plans on an incremental basis. The best that
might be possible is to allocate costs propor-
tionally to what were the initial projections of
demand or requests for services. Of course,
those data might not be available, and then ac-
tual usage averaged out over some appropri-
ately lengthy period would probably be the
most appropriate procedure.
V.3 Practical Solutions
The discussion above indicates that it would
likely be difficult to allocate costs based on the
Shapley value. This is not to suggest it would
be impossible, but rather more that it would be
less practical the greater the complexity of the
network. The Shapley value is difficult to ex-
plain. However, for simpler systems, or com-
Energy Studies Review, Vol. 8 [1996], Iss. 2, Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.mcmaster.ca/esr/vol8/iss2/5
plex ones that have been aggregated in zones,
the Shapley value essentially reduces to the
cost allocation determined by the decomposi-
tion principle, which is reasonably straight-
forward. So, to a large extent the practicality of
the Shapley value will depend on the degree of
cost decomposability and on the extent to
which costs can be aggregated.
There would likely be difficulties in apply-
ing the Shapley value or decomposition prin-
ciple to a complex system arising from a large
number of pipeline delivery and receipt nodes.
One example is the NGTL system in Alberta.
Here there are a plethora of receipt and deliv-
ery points with a great deal of common costs.
In such a case, it would be more practical to
aggregate various sets of users which are simi-
1ar in some dimension, such as geographic
proximity, and then to employ a weighted ver-
sion of the Shapley value to the groups in par-
titioning the entire set of users. Such weighted
versions of the Shapley value would continue
to satisfy many equity conditions as well. This
also leads to the notion of zonal charges.
Breaking up the system into zones, so that
all users who share more or less equally in the
use of the system contribute equally to its
costs, can approximate tolls that would be de-
termined by the Shapley value. In other words,
the average distances for shippers who use
many of the same facilities can be used to de-
termine the tolls. So, if two shippers require
use of transport facilities through some region,
the average distance of transport, as well as
the cost per mile or kilometre of the facilities,
can be used to set tolls, or charges, for ship-
ments in, through, or out of that zone.
VI. Other Equity and Efficiency
Concerns
The cost-allocation rule used in setting tolls for
a pipeline system has an effect on user incen-
tives to participate, to bypass, and to invest in
the development of new and existing fields.
Here we discuss how these factors can affect
the optimal design of a cost-allocation scheme.
V1.1 Incentive Compatibility for Shippers and the
Pipeline
One specific problem that is typically a con-
cern of regulatory agencies when allocating
costs is the fact that the costs allocated to a
firm might not exceed that firm's stand-alone
costs (and therefore satisfy the stand-alone and
incremental cost fairness criteria) and yet ex-
ceed the firm's willingness to pay. For exam-
ple, a gas producer might prefer to shut down
some wells rather than pay its allocated share
of the costs of serving those sites, and yet be
willing to pay the incremental costs for the
pipeline to provide service to those wells. The
regulatory authority will not generally know
the gas producers' minimum or "choke" prices,
nor will the authority know the incremental
costs of providing service to each receipt point.
The notions of fairness and efficiency em-
bodied in the incremental cost test imply that
the cost allocation should not establish tolls in
such a way that a user ever faces a cost alloca-
tion exceeding his willingness to pay when
that willingness to pay is more than his incre-
mental costs. Additionally, the system opera-
tor should face incentives to provide service to
every gas producer whose willingness to pay
exceeds the incremental costs of service. How-
ever, these fairness and efficiency goals typi-
cally cannot be fully realized in practice. A
regulator will not know each shipper's "choke"
price, that is, there is incomplete information.
In addition, the pipeline company will not
know that price either. Similarly, neither the
regulator nor the shippers will know the
pipeline company's costs.
The optimal tariff scheme will maximize
fairness and efficiency goals subject to incen-
tive compatibility and constraints, that is the
pipeline and the shippers will respond to the
tariff rule so as to maximize their own objec-
tives (such as long-run profits) given their
costs (which are known only to them). How-
ever, a toll system which meets these incen-
tive-compatibility conditions imposes tolls,
which in some cases will deter the pipeline
from providing service to wells where willing-
ness to pay exceeds incremental costs. This fol-
lows because in practice the regulatory au-
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thority will not know the willingness to pay,
choke prices, or incremental costs, and neither
the pipeline nor the gas producers have much
of an incentive to report these values accu-
rately. So, rather then over-pay the pipeline,
the regulator might, for instance, wish to allow
some situations to arise in which some gas that
should be shipped is not. 10
There is a sizable literature on these types
of incentive problems. Price-cap and incentive-
regulation schemes are designed, in part, to
provide a utility operator with the appropriate
incentives under regulation to provide service
to every user for which incremental costs are
less than willingness to pay. Such pricing flex-
ibility will typically lead to distance-sensitive
tolls.
Additionally, some incentive schemes that
can be implemented present each user with a
menu of choices. The choices would effectively
allow each user to reveal its valuations,11
These mechanisms need not satisfy many of
the fairness criteria discussed above. However,
it is also the case that the participation con-
straint, that tolls not exceed choke prices be-
cause the cost allocation assigns them too large
a cost share, might not be a pressing issue
when transport costs are a relatively small
share of the total costs of marketing gas.
VI.2 Static and Dynamic Efficiency
Another concern is that any cost-allocation re-
sult be as efficient an outcome as possible.
Trade-offs between efficiency and equity can
arise. In choosing between policy measures it
is useful to keep both in mind, and certainly
options that adversely affect both efficiency
and equity should be avoided.
In terms of'static efficiency, one of the main
concerns is that gas be delivered to users at
10/ Other concepts of fairness, such as those embod-
ied in the Shapley value, or a desire to subsidize
development in some regions over others, can also
conflict with the application of the incremental cost
test.
11/ It has been shown that mechanisms can be con-
structed that are: (a) efficient; (b) incentive-compat-
ible; (c) individually rational (i.e., pass a stand-alone
cost test); and (d) allocate costs exactly. See Young
(1994).
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minimum total costs - including extraction
and shipping costs. A postage-stamp scheme,
or any other cost-allocation scheme that is not
distance-sensitive, will effectively cross-sub-
sidize output from remote and more costly
sites (as already noted). Moreover, non-dis-
tance-sensitive cost-allocation mechanisms,
and any other cost-allocation mechanism that
provides cross subsidies, have effects on in-
vestment incentives that could accentuate
welfare losses from cross subsidies over time.
For example, cross-subsidization of remote
sites at the expense of nearby ones could lead
to increasingly larger output at the remote
sites than would have been the case without
subsidies. Without a cross subsidy, a firm
might invest in new facilities in a location
closer to delivery points than would be the
case if a cross subsidy existed. This means that
the social cost of extraction and delivery will
be higher than optimal in the long run. The
short-run effects of the postage-stamp scheme
will simply tend to alter extraction rates be-
tween facilities, but could also cause some lo-
cations that should remain open to shut down.
VI.3 Complexity
Strict adherence to many of the principles dis-
cussed above can impose significant costs on
both the regulatory agency and the pipeline.
However, the principles do have practical
value. For instance, as noted above price-cap
schemes are, in some sense, simplified incen-
tive-compatible mechanisms. Similarly, a
Simple system of zonal changes can be used to
approximate the Shapley value or the nucleo-
lus. The practical problem facing a regulatory
agency is to balance theoretical performance
with administrative and compliance costs
arising from possible complexity.
VII. Summary
We have examined various ways in which a
fair and reasonable pipeline cost-allocation
scheme can be implemented. Uniform charges
such as those reprinted by postage-stamp cost
allocations will not usually satisfy most con-
cepts of fairness and reasonableness. In addi-
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Fairness and Eguity Criteria
Synunetry SAC/IC Decomposable Determinable Monotonic
Postage Stamp Y N N Y Y
Nucleolus Y Y N Y N
Shapley Value Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: SAC/IC =Stand-Alone/Incremental Cost Tests; Y := Yes; N == No.
Consistency
N
Y
Y
tion, postage-stamp cost allocations can result
in inefficient production patterns and in ineffi-
cient bypass.
We have argued that cost allocations
should pass a stand-alone cost test and an in-
cremental cost test. In other words, no one
should pay costs in excess of their stand-alone
costs and no one should pay less than their
incremental costs. These criteria can rule out
many obvious cost allocations, such as
postage-stamp rates, but do not identify a
unique outcome.
We then proposed that a cost allocation in
which each party pays its proportional share
of the parts of the network it uses would meet
most of the criteria for fairness and reason-
ableness considered. In particular, such a cost
scheme would be symmetric, in that it would
treat equals the same, pass through direct
costs, be consistent when the set of users and
load patterns change, and be monotonic, in
that no one's cost share could fall if total costs
were to increase.
We explained how such a rule might be
implemented. The main difficulty is in deter-
mining the appropriate manner in which to
decompose the cost elements when there is no
direct contract between the parties at the re-
ceiving node and the delivery node. In such
cases, those involved in determining the tolls
at the two ends would need to identify which
system components are being used to provide
service to the parties involved. We argued that
a system of zonal charges can approximate the
ideal cost allocation, and can involve much
lower administrative costs. Our results are
summarized in the table (above).
One of the cost-allocation methodologies,
the postage-stamp scheme, fails to respond to
more than half the six fairness and equity cri-
teria considered. The nucleolus responds
favourably to four of these six criteria, while
the Shapley value will in most cases address
all six.
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